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D72We consider a Blotto game with Incomplete Information. A pure-strategy symmetric monotonic Bayesian
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A topic of a particular interest in economics and political science is
the behavior of players facing resource distribution decisions. We
consider a Blotto game with Incomplete Information regarding player
resources where players seek to maximize their expected payoffs.
Players make allocation decisions simultaneously and whichever
player spends the most on a particular contest wins that contest. The
natural set of questions to ask in this situation is: How should players
allocate their private budgets? Will all players compete for all prizes?
Should we expect one player to win all the prizes? We find and
characterize a pure-strategy symmetric monotonic Bayesian equili-
brium (SMBE) for this game and answer these key questions.
There are two directions in the literaturewhich are close to the topic
of this paper. The first one is different Colonel Blotto games; see Borel
(1921), Gross and Wagner (1950), Blackett (1958), Bellman (1969),
Young (1978), Laslier and Picard (2002), Roberson (2006), Kvasov
(2007), and Weinstein (2006) among others. In its most general case,
the Blotto game presents two players with the problem of allocating a
finite resource pool over N “fronts” or contests, which are then played
simultaneously. Each front or contest has its own valuation attached to
it, and this in turn impacts how players choose to distribute their
resources. Virtually all Blotto formulations are analyzed in a setting of
complete information, where all players have common knowledge
regarding their opponents' budget constraints. While analysis carried
out under the assumption of complete information has been insightful,l comments.
versity of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,
93.
l rights reserved.the predictions of those papers are alwaysmixed-strategy equilibria and
flawless information about opponents, and in particular about oppo-
nents' budgetary constraints, is rarely available.1
A substantial body of literature exists on one- and multi-object
auctions where bidders are subjected to budgetary constraints during
the game (Che and Gale, 1998, 2003; Benoit and Krishna, 2001;
Szentes and Rosenthal, 2003a,b). Such models correspond closely to
the one that we are analyzing as players are forced to allocate scarce
resources over multiple contests. As in the case of the Blotto literature,
virtually all analysis of such auctions has been carried out under
conditions of complete information. In one of the few models with an
incomplete information setting analyzed by Che and Gale (1998),
private information enters the picture through player valuations of
one object, not player budgets as in our model. Furthermore, work by
Pitchik (1995) in a scenario of incomplete information that extends to
budget constraints is limited by the imposition of a one-dimensional
bidder “type” which determines both bidder's valuation and budget.
Although our model does not allow for dynamic investigations of
multi-unit cases such as those conducted by Benoit and Krishna (2001), it
has the advantage of being more realistic insofar as bidders' budgets are
private information and that this private information is not restricted by
the imposition of a bidder type which also determines bidder valuations.
In this sense, our model represents a case of the general multi-object
auction; we model a N-object auction with budget constraints, but with
the caveat that such constraints are private information. All that a bidder
knows about her opponent is the distribution fromwhich her budgetwas
drawn. Also our results can be complimentedwith results on the so-called
Chopsticks auction obtained by Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a,b). Their1 Snyder (1989) and Matros (2007) find pure-strategy equilibria in stochastic
versions of Blotto games.
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player wants to win a “majority” of objects.
2. The model
There are K risk-neutral players. Each player k has her private
budget Xk. We assume that each Xk is independently and identically
distributed on the interval [0,1] according to the increasing distribu-
tion function F, where F(0)=0, F(1)=1. There are N prizes. The value
of prize i isWiN0 for all players and∑i=1N Wi=1. Each player k has to
allocate her budget Xk across all N prizes. The players are competing
for all N prizes simultaneously. We assume that player kwins prize i if
xi
kNmax {xi1,…, xik−1, xik+1,…, xiK}, where xij is the budget allocation of
player j for prize i. We will use the upper index for the players and the
lower index for the prizes. All players submit their budget allocations
simultaneously. A pure strategy of player k is a N-dimensional vector
(x1k, …, xNk ), such that∑j=1N xjk=Xk.
Player k obtains the following payoff
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A strategy for a player k is a function βk=(β1k,… βNk ): [0,1]→ [0,1]N









βkiz0 for any k = 1; N ;K and i = 1; N ;N:
2.1. Pure-strategy symmetric monotonic Bayesian equilibrium
We are looking for a pure-strategy symmetric monotonic Bayesian
equilibrium (SMBE) — an equilibrium where all players follow the
same strategy, (β1k, β2k, …, βNk )=(β1, β2, …, βN) for any k =1, …, K,
and if xNy, then βi (x)Nβi (y) for any prize i=1, …, N.2
Theorem 1. If G≡FK−1 is concave, then β* (x)=(W1x, W2x, …, WNx)
constitutes a unique SMBE.
Proof. Suppose that all players but player 1 follow the symmetric,
increasing and differentiable strategy β* (x)=(W1x, W2x, …, WNx).
Suppose that player 1 receives a budget, X1=x, to allocate. Wewant
to determine the optimal allocation (x11, …, xN1), s.t. x11+…+xN1=x.
Then, player 1 solves the following maximization problem
max
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x1j = x: ð3Þ2 Our requirement is similar to Noldeke and Samuelson's (2003) “Net Viability”
condition.Denote













Sincewe assume that the private budgets are distributed according
to the distribution function F on the interval [0, 1], the maximization
problem (2)–(3) becomes
max
x11 ; N ;x
1
N

































In order to finish the proof of the theorem, we have to verify that T
(x11, …, xN1) is a concave function. Since, by the assumption, function G
is concave, T (x11, …, xN1) must be a concave function as a sum of
concave functions.3 □
The following example illustrates Theorem 1.
Example. Suppose that F tð Þ = t23, W1=.75, and W2=.25.
If K=2, the main condition of the theorem holds: G tð Þ = t23 is
concave and there exists a SMBEwhich is given by the functionβ* (x)=
(.75x, .25x).
If K=3, the main condition of the theorem is violated: G tð Þ = t43 is
convex.
Suppose that x=.8. Fig. 1 shows the expected payoff of a player as
a function of her spending for prize 1, given that her opponents
allocate their budgets according to the rule β*. The red solid (blue
dotted) line corresponds to K=2 (K=3). It is clear from the graph
that β* (x)=(W1x, W2x) does not constitutes a SMBE in K=3 case.4
2.2. Properties of the SMBE
Since the SMBE is described in the previous subsection, we can
discuss its properties now. These properties provide answers to the
questions we posed in the Introduction section. The next three results
follow from the structure of the SMBE.
Corollary 1. All players compete for all prizes in the SMBE.
Corollary 2. Each player spends more on more valuable prizes in the
SMBE.This is a well-known result that appears in all of the standard optimization theory
texts. For example, see p. 519 of Blume and Simon (1994).
4 Note that G″=(K− 1) F K− 3 [Ff′+(K− 2) f 2]. Hence, for any given function F,
there exists K0 such that G″N0 for any KNK0, or the main condition of the theoremwill
be violated.
Fig. 1. Example.
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SMBE.
The expected equilibrium payoff of a player with budget x can be
calculated using the maximization problem (2) and (3). Corollary 2
provides an explanation for the result: a player either wins all prizes or
none of them.
Corollary 4. The expected payoff of a player with budget x is G (x).
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